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The Nautical Institute - Canada - British Columbia - Parksville (ID: 30294)
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n would do much to take the burden off the organizers. Captain Lewis reported that the Justice Institute theatre is all ready for us with all the audio visual equipment at our disposal. Discussion then centred around the panel that would finish the program as to its composition and focus. Volunteers to chair the panel were sought. There was some thought given to moving the panel discussion earlier than 1600 hours in order not to lose the Island members and to catch people before they were too fatigued to fully participate. It was agreed to let Captains Patterson and Lewis rework the timing to account for the changes in speakers and the suggestions that had come about as a result of this meeting. The Chairman offered to call the various Classification Societies representatives to drum up support. In concluding, the Directors considered that notwithstanding the numbers registered so far, there would be some people who will simply show up to swell the overall attendance figures. It was hoped that the final number might reach 50 at least. Item 6 - CMAC Items The Chairman discussed with Captain Farid the submission by the Branch on the proposal to incorporate the new ILO Convention as a seafarer s Bill of Rights or something similar. Captain Farid reported having completed the submission and that he was ready to go to Ottawa for the national CMAC to represent the Nautical Institute, BC Branch as is his wont. Item 7 - Branch Business Plan (1st Draft) The Chairman opened the discussion by stating that he intended that he and the Secretary would move the project ahead together and that he would raise the matter at the next meeting. The plan, he felt , was generally good and asked that everyone make input and comment. He could set up a forum on the website to make it even easier to make comments. On the subject of mentoring cadets Captain Johnston reported that he was going to BMC on 24th October to speak to the cadets currently in the program there. Item 8 - Advertising on the Web Site The Chairman stated that in light of the request by Ferriby Marine to advertise their training course to all our members, he considered that this service could indeed be provided. However, it should be recognised that the Branch should receive appropriate compensation for doing so to cover the cost involved with production and maintenance of various advertisements. Item 9 - Spring Seminar Reiterating his earlier comment that Security was an excellent choice for the Spring Seminar, the Chairman indicated that the time has come to start preparations and to that end he asked the Vice Chairman (Island) to strike an organizing committee. Action: Captain Farid. Item 10 - Any Other Business ColRegs Amendment Captain Johnston asked that members review the documents he provided concerning his proposal for an amendment. Concerning the means of vessels exchanging identities by radio telephone. Captain Mann of Transport Canada needs to receive clear written indication that there is widespread support for this amendment before he can send it to Ottawa for consideration. The Chairman agreed that he would put up a page on the web and ask for input. Action : All Speakers from within the Branch The Secretary suggested that perhaps we were overlooking some of the members when it came to speakers on interesting professional topics. He mentioned Captain Snider and his recent experiences as an Ice Pilot in the Arctic and that Captain H. Silvester had recently returned from the Bering Sea. For those Stick close to their desks and never go to sea . to paraphrase Gilbert and Sullivan, their stories would make most interesting listening. Captain Smiley suggested that this would be best undertaken in the informality of a social gathering at a local hostelry and there was general agreement. Presentations to Cadets The Chairman mentioned that Captain Johnston s remarks about speaking to the cadets at BMC earlier reminded him that it was time to literally show the flag more at our various gatherings. To this end he asked the Secretary to investigate the cost of another large flag and a number of small , table-top versions. Action : Secretary Maritime Coalition on Education Captain Avey reported that the Coalition has just completed the first phase of its project but there is not yet complete satisfaction. The HRDC contractor has decided that there is a problem getting seafarers for senior shore positions, which has hardly come as a surprise to anyone in the industry. They are getting ready for Phase Two. The Chairman thanked Captain Avey and asked him to stay with this project and report. I tem 11 - Next Meeting The Secretary reminded everyone that as the normal meeting day would fall on Remembrance Day, next month the meeting will be on Wednesday, 12 th November at 1700 aboard the Spirit of Vancouver Island . The ship being now in her berth, Captain Snider moved that the meeting be adjourned. Carried Submitted by : Captain J.K. Steele MNI Secretary Approved by: Captain S.W. Bowles FNI - Chairman From Lloyds List From Lloyds List "WIND SONG" (BAHAMAS) London, Dec 20 -- A press report, dated today, states: Officials in Tahiti say they spent $3 million rescuing passenger Wind Song that caught fire while sailing in French Polynesia, and have seized the vessel while they wrangle with Princess executives about it. The newspaper Dispatches of Tahiti reported this week that the luxury sail-liner is now under French Polynesian government control in Papeete harbour. Windstar says the vessel is beyond repair and proposes to tow it to deep water, sink it, and write it off. London, Dec 20 -- A press report, dated today, states: A court in Tahiti has reportedly ordered the seizure of passenger Wind Song that was recently gutted by fire. The order follows the French Navy's demand for payment, for putting out the blaze. It took three days to extinguish the fire that started in the engine-room of the four-masted vessel while it was off French Polynesia. All 127 passengers and 75 crew were rescued and the French Navy towed the vessel to Papeete harbour. Local media reports that although the French Navy is not attempting to recover costs of the rescue, it wants the vessel's owners to pay for the firefighting operation and the tow to Papeete. The future of the vessel is unclear. Papeete, Dec 20 -- Passenger Wind Song arrested by French Navy at Papeete, pending agreement on towage/salvage award with owners. Matter under litigation at present. Preliminary fire damage to vessel extensive, sparing, we understand, only passenger accommodations. Owners apparently considering options which include repair of vessel, sale of vessel "as is" or scuttling vessel in local waters, after removal all items of value and all possible pollutant. -- Lloyd's Agents. Papeete, Dec 21 -- Passenger Wind Song released from arrest Dec 19, as signed agreement with owner on salvage award received by French Naval Authorities surveys/evaluations. -- Lloyd's Agents. The Nautical Institute The Nautical Institute British Columbia Branch Directors Meeting: Tuesday 7 th December 2004 , The Training Room at Tsawwassen Ferry Terminal. AGENDA In attendance: Chairman Vice-Chairman, Mainland Vice-Chairman, Island Treasurer Secretary Directors: Members: Regrets received from : Captains Bowles, Shard, B. Silvester, Avey , Smiley AGENDA ITEMS 1. Adoption of Agenda 2. Minutes of last meeting 3. Business arising from Minutes of last meeting 4. Treasurer s Report 5. Spring Seminar Planning and Budget 6. IALA Conference on Long Range Identification and Tracking Secretary 7. IALA Definitions Paper (Request for Input)- Secretary 8. CMAC highlights- Captain Farid 9. NI Request for Salary Data- update by Secretary 10. Any Other Business 11. Next Meeting Fatigue Nautical Institute - B.C. Branch "Fatigue" Seminar The following is a presentation given by Neil Hamilton at the Institute of Ocean Sciences (IOS) Patricia Bay, Vancouver Island on April 20, 1996 The Introduction was delivered by Captain David Batchelor FNI I guess what prompted us to start on this course, which has resulted in the seminar today, was my involvement back in November of last year when myself and two pilots attended a seminar in Washington put on by NASA and the US Transportation Safety Board. This seminar involved not just the marine mode but all aspects of transportation fatigue with some 500 delegates. Initially they focused on the general problems with fatigue and it's causes and what can be done to control it. During the second day we broke down into specific groups, Marine, Air, Rail, Road and Pipeline and it hit home with me as Jim said, you get the hallucinations the tiredness and falling asleep on the job and in my work with pilotage this has become very apparent, particularly at this time of year with the coming of the cruise ships. It was discussed, and felt, that it might be an opportune time to promote a seminar having an educational, informational session and through various recommendations I was able to contact all the speakers. On reading their CV's and I thought "my God, what have I been doing all my life, because these people are very very well qualified?" Two of them being directly involved with the marine field. Our first speaker is involved in the air specifically and the second is a brain specialist. Firstly, I would like to introduce Mr. Neil Hamilton. He is currently a professor at the Algonquin College, teaching physics and aviation human factors. He has intertwined his interest in the process of designing and implementing effective instructional techniques with his special interest in aviation and human factors. For us less educated, and please correct me if I am wrong, human factors deals in human behaviour, fatigue and this sort of thing. Mr. Hamilton trained as a navigator with the Royal Canadian Air Force and has been a licensed pilot since 1960. He attended Rayston Polytechnic Institute at the East Ontario Institute of Technology. He began teaching in 1967 and has designed numerous forms of instruction, workshops and courses. Recently he was involved in the development and delivery of winter bush survival training for air crew personnel for the Ministry of Natural Resources Air Services. He headed a nationwide advisory committee from the Departments of Ministry of Defence to design a training and upgrading programme for abinitio and licensed pilots with an emphasis on human factors. Mr. Hamilton, in company with Justice V. Moshansky of the Dryden Inquiry designed and implemented the inaugural aviation human factors courses in Canada. These course designs have since been adopted and implemented by many air colleges and institutions. Mr. Hamilton was a member of the four person Air Canada team responsible for authoring and producing three books for Transport Canada, Basic Human Factors, Teaching Human Factors and Advanced Human Factors. These three books will become integral resources for the integration of human factors knowledge within the existing flight training requirements for future Canadian pilots. As one may realize, there are many parallels in the air industry with the marine industry and some are remarkable. I'd like you to welcome Neil Hamilton. Mr. N. Hamilton It is a pleasure to be here. I am a technician, I take research data and construct courseware and deliver it to pilots. It's very important that we start with the young people in this complex system within all transportation modes. Human factors is about people and about their working and living environment, it s about their relationship with machines and equipment and the procedures around them. It's also about how they relate to people. I'm going to start with a model called the "SHELL Model". It was developed by Dr. Edwards in 1972. The components are the Liveware (the operator); Hardware; Software; and Environment and the different issues that are involved. The shapes within the model are jagged on purpose, they have to match (like a jigsaw puzzle), if they mismatch this indicates potential errors in the system. The centre Liveware represents the operational personnel themselves. They are the hub of the system as well as the most flexible component in the system. The remaining components must be designed to match the central Liveware component. The physical and psychological well-being of the Liveware will influence how they will function with the other components of the system as well as the other components influence on the Liveware. Liveware is constructed to function effectively only within a narrow range of environmental conditions such as temperature, pressure, noise, time of day, light, darkness. Although the Liveware component has the ability to collect vast amounts of information, the Liveware processing capabilities has severe limitations. The decision making stage of the process consist of just one single channel and this bottleneck impedes the whole processing system. While one piece of information is being processed, the others are shunted into the unreliable short-term memory to await their turn. If the Liveware is in a information overload condition, this can result in poorly managed load shedding with the possible result of discarding important information. Liveware is subject to erroneous perception and conclusions reached about the nature and meaning of messages. Stress and fatigue can cause perception tunnelling - that is - concentrating on a single stimulus, with other stimulus being ignored.. This is a breeding ground of error. The Captain says Take-off Power and the new co-pilot shuts down the throttles instead of applying full power. Cut-off date has a different perception in a middle east prison than at the Victoria Hydro office. The Liveware has to deal with ambiguous information which causes expectation. ...There are a number of aircraft lined up waiting for take-off--two in front, two in the middle, and two in the rear. Its probably concluded that there are 6 aircraft, but there could possibly be only 4. In the aviation transportation industry the Liveware performance is severely degraded by the three goblins of the sky: Stress Fatigue and Boredom . You sit there and wait for something to happen and you're not running at full speed. 99% of boredom and 1% sheer terror when in fact you're supposed to be up to 100% at all times. Hardware designers must not only design comfortable seats to fit the Liveware component, but must address the complex problem of designing controls and displays to match the information processing characteristics of man. Improper location and coding of controls can provide incorrect data and lead to improper inputs by the Liveware component. The Designers of hardware must assure that the tendency known as population stereotyping is applied properly to the people operating the equipment. For example a European designing equipment for use in North America could create a problem. We in North America turn on a light switch in an upward direction - versus- downwards as in Europe. This could cause problems in an emergency. None of the pilots who died reading the three pointer altimeter (if we could consult them) would still know what happened to them. It was a notorious piece of equipment. During the hectic Berlin Airlift there was a higher than normal accident rate among the experienced pilots participating. Pilots with multi-hours on for example, B-25 s were also acting as crew members on C-47 s and C-82 s. But there was non standard cockpit control layout between these aircraft. B-25 s had Throttle Prop Mixture C-47 s had Prop Throttle Mixture C-82 s had Mixture Throttle Prop Persons put into sudden emergency situation that require an action will most likely fall back automatically on their training or drills and follow that rehearsed action. The heavy workload induced fatigue and stress and in conjunction with the non standard cockpits control layouts, caused many incorrect control inputs in demanding situations resulting in unnecessary accidents. The Liveware - Software interface encompasses the non-physical aspects of the system, manuals, checklist layout, symbology, regulations and computer software. Maps and charts that show required information under white light may lose or show incomplete information under red light. Digital Displays: if one segment fails in a 7 segment display, a figure 8 can appear as a 0 or a 6 or a 9 . In the case of regulations, rules of the road: A vessel required not to impede the passage or the safe passage of another vessel is not relieved of this latter obligation if approaching the other vessel so as to involve risk of collision and shall, when taking action, have full regard to the action which may be required by the rules of this part . Captain A. Dickson of Shell Oil stated at the International Tanker Safety Conference, 1971 that it s probable fair to say that these Rules of the Road are regarded by people at sea as very clear in their application to determining responsibility after a collision, but of dubious value in relation to collision avoidance. The following incident illustrates poor manual design.... Upon detecting smoke from the cargo hold, the L-1011 returned to the airport, landed safely, turned off the runway and stopped. The crew searched for the cargo hold smoke warning procedure. This procedure was distributed between the emergency section, the abnormal section, and the additional sections of the manual. Three precious minutes were lost. All 301 passengers and crew died from the effects of the toxic smoke and fire. An L-1011 can be evacuated in three minutes. The manuals were poorly designed. The Liveware - Environment interface is associated with environmental factors such as noise, heat, lighting, vibration and the disturbance of biological rhythms in long range flying resulting in irregular working and sleeping patterns. In addition this interface is associated with factors in the political, social, economic, regulatory, weather and training environments, and their impact on operational efficiency. We will touch on these later in our case study. Liveware - Liveware interface focuses on the interaction among people and its effects on crew effectiveness. Shortcomings at this interface reduce operational efficiency and cause misunderstanding and errors. Captain/Mate - Captain/Co-pilot, Cockpit Crew/Cabin Crew. The investigation into the Dryden Crash revealed that there were three pilots on board as passengers on the aircraft. They saw the ice on the wings, but... "it's not my province he's the Captain of the ship". They could have just got up from their seats or could have yelled "Get the ice off" but they deferred to the pilot in command! By 1975 the International Air Transport Association (IATA) concluded that the wider nature of Human Factors in aviation was still not appreciated and that this neglect may bring about a major disaster. This statement was followed 17 months later by the double 747 disaster at Tenerife in which 583 people died. In low visibility and fog, the KLM 747 had taxied to the end of runway 30 and had turned around and lined up waiting for takeoff clearance. A Pan American 747 was also taxing on runway 30 and was suppose to leave the runway at the third exit. The KLM co-pilot was just recently checked out by KLM s senior pilot and chief flying instructor, who happened to be serving also as captain on this flight. The KLM co-pilot radioed the tower we are ready for takeoff . The tower reply of Standby for Takeoff was obliterated by a transmission from the Pam American 747 reporting that they were still on the runway looking for the third exit. The crew of the KLM 747 were at the end of their duty cycle, and had experienced delays and minor mechanical problems but they had to fly soon to stay within their legal flight duty time limits. The fatigued and stressed KLM captain nudged the throttles forward,- his co-pilot said Wait a minute , we do not have ATC clearance the captain said Go ahead get it The tower came back reading the ATC clearance, The Captain said Yes, We go - check thrust and started the roll. The co-pilot was startled, that was a ATC clearance, not a take-off clearance. The flight engineer was confused also and said Is he not clear the Pan American The KLM crew were unsure as to where the other 747 was, but despite this the Captain proceeded with the takeoff, unchallenged by the other confused crew members. The collision occurred 13 seconds later. . The last statement on the KLM cockpit voice recorders was the tired KLM Captain simply saying Oh, shit. 583 people died in the resulting collision and fire. Symptoms of Fatigue any tendency for performing at less than an optimum capacity, a depletion of body energy reserves, leading to below par performance, fatigue can also refer to a human state of mental confusion , or diminished performance caused by emotional trauma and stress. Reviewing the symptoms of fatigue we can see that the first characteristic is straight forward,. you're tired and not getting enough R&R. As well as the second symptom, if you re out of fuel (food) or rest, your not at peak. Which brings us to the third statement, this subjective grey area of diminished human performance. The combination of stress and fatigue is very hazardous and can kill you. Stress can induce fatigue and fatigue can induce stress. Types of Fatigue Acute Fatigue Chronic Fatigue Acute Fatigue is a normal occurrence in everyday living. It is the tiredness felt after a long day, or after long periods of physical or mental activities. Acute fatigue can be cured and prevented by adequate rest, nutrition and regular exercise. Chronic Fatigue sets in when there is not enough recovery time between episodes of Acute Fatigue. You build up a sleep debt. Your performance will continue to fall off. Recovery requires a prolonged period of rest and the root causes must be eliminated. In a well documented case, a senior U.S. Air Force pilot was being tested for a wide range of diseases including Aids, but to no avail. In the final analysis it was determined that he was suffering from severe chronic fatigue. Effects of Fatigue affects decision making negative impact on co-ordination less able to deal with other people especially in conflict situations degrades attention and concentration resulting in missed cues or information - affects decision making: The Challenger Space Shuttle accident investigation stated... the effects of sleep loss, excessive duty shifts, disruption of circadian rhythms and resulting fatigue all were part of a misguided decision to launch that morning in spite of concern about it s safety - less able to deal with other people: from a cockpit voice recorder .. Don t talk, do your job and I ll fly the plane . The captain had been involved in a crew argument before the flight and graffiti directed at the captain was found in the flight deck of the crashed L-1011. The crew had been on a long duty cycle. - degrades attention and concentration resulting in missed cues and information: In 1974 at 0500 hrs. -a British Airways 747 was cleared from 30,000 ft. to 7500 ft. for its approach to Nairobi airport. This was incorrectly read back by the co-pilot as 5000 feet. Nairobi ATC did not detect or correct the error. The problem was that Nairobi airport is 5327 ft above sea level. The aircraft barely missed the ground by 70 ft. This is what you would call a pucker Factor The crew had been on duty for nine hours during what would have been their normal sleep period. Additionally, at 0500 hrs,. their physical, psychological and biochemical functions were at their lowest. Fatigue tends to: focus your attention on things that require activity rather than thought lowers your ability to handle multi-task lowers your discipline, encouraging acceptance of greater margins of error makes it difficult to muster enthusiasm and energy to pay attention to detail - focus your attention on activity and - lowers your ability to handle multi tasks: Dec. 29, 1972, an Eastern Airlines L-1011 had an indication of a gear malfunction on it s approached Miami. The crew became totally pre-occupied with the gear and gear light indicator ... must be the bulb ...The captain inadvertently disengaged the auto-pilot as he leaned over the yoke to fiddle with the indicator bulb. The crew ignored everything else no one was minding the store ,- the aircraft slowly descended into the Everglades, killing a large number of people. - lowers your discipline, encouraging acceptance of risk . August 18, 1993 a 707 cargo plane crashed while doing an unusual demanding approach to the US navy base in Cuba. Although the crew could have used runway 28 which was the normal and easier runway. From the cockpit voice recording the Captain said "for the heck of it let's try runway 10", "lets see what it's like". The investigators concluded that the captain's fatigue affected his decision to try this unusual approach. When they reviewed the crew duty times they stated that the crew was to 'numbed' by fatigue to even tackle this procedure. You don't usually see the word numbed by fatigue in an accident report, but that's how fatigued they were. - difficulty to pay attention ..... on the landing the captain said to his tired co-pilot "cheer up", sure enough the tired co-pilot thought the captain said " gear up". and put the gear up. Case Study : For the case study we will use an accident that happened in Maine on 30 May, 1979, and explore the impact of stress and fatigue on this incident. We will start at the accident site and work back over events. On May 30, 1979 approx. 20:50 hr. a Downeast Airline Twin Otter was 2 miles from the end of the runway at an airspeed of 110 M.P.H. and descending faster than either pilot realized. They were below 500 feet in fog. Seconds later the aircraft pounded into the forest - 350 feet from the shoreline of a place ironically named Otter Point. There were 15 people killed and one terribly mangled survivor. Reactions by Downeast Pilots to the crash That damned engine! No way, NO WAY , would Chief Pilot Jim Merryman have flown into the trees without a major mechanical failure. Not Jim Merryman, for crying out loud. He wouldn t have let the co-pilot s poor skills in handling the aircraft kill him. Those who had flown with the co-pilot Hines - felt a twinge - the cold edge of recrimination for something left undone, something important left unsaid. As you can see from the overhead, the other pilots made no mention of fatigue, nor mention of sleep deprivation, nor mention of stress as a possible contributing factors to the crash. These were not causes of accidents in 1979. Pilots were made of "the right stuff". They were trained to handle fatigue and stress: isn't that why they are pilots?! July 3: 1979.. NTSB accident investigator, Al Diehl was taken off the accident investigation GO-Team and assigned full time to the Down East Airline crash. Thus began the first full HUMAN FACTORS performance investigation in the history of the National Transportation Safety Board. Al Diehl was a relatively new investigator with the NTSB but he gathered enough evidence to indicate the possibility of other causes of this accident. Up to this point in time, when investigators discovered human failure as the cause of an accident that was pretty well the conclusion - pilot error. "Just write it up as pilot error". This term "pilot error" suggests that the nature of the error is unique. We don't say "surgeon error" when the operation fails, we don't say "manager\director error" when the company fails, we don't say "butcher error" when we get a bad cut of meat. The term "pilot error" or "human error" focuses our attention on what happened, not why it happened. This focus on human error is one thing that has retarded accident prevention activities. The second statement in the overhead is of significance also, as I have already mentioned, it was the first full human factor performance investigation and finally someone would represented the dead pilot in his absence. Canada s turn came 10 years later with the tragic Air Ontario Crash at Dryden. The Canadian Aviation Safety Board was in turmoil and reorganizing as a result of disagreements about controversial findings into the 1986 Gander Crash in which 250 American soldiers died. Because of this turmoil, the investigation was assigned to Justice V.P. Moshansky (also a pilot). All 197 of the Commissions recommendations were implemented. The Dryden commissions investigation, from a human factors perspective is noted world wide as a document that has revolutionized aircraft accident investigation. As a note, fatigue & stress were contributing factors in the crash. Let's get back to the Downeast accident case study. This overhead shows the Liveware-Environment in which pilots at Downeast Airlines were working in. Stedger was the owner manager of Downeast Airlines . For years Stengar pressured his pilots to break minimum's and go down to 300 ft. to complete the flight to avoid the expense of bussing passengers from Augusta. When you are making an instrument approach there are minimums. In this particular case Rockland Airport had a minimum of 440 feet. Pilots are allowed to come in bad weather to 440 feet and time themselves from a fixed point, if the runway is not seen within a certain period of time the pilot executes a missed approach and comes around, if he's going to try it again, or he goes to his alternate airport. Jim poured out his frustrations about Downeast to his sister-in-law. Stengar seems to think it s great when one of the pilots takes off in zero-zero fog with passengers. They re tired of it, I m tired of it and I m exhausted, the whole thing is impossible. I really don t know how much longer I can stand this. It s impossible. He keeps the pilots upset all the time, he yells at me over and over and undermines any decisions I make.. This is getting to be a horror show, were short of pilot s and I can t find new ones. Pacing he said: God Sharon, I m so tired I could sleep for a week, I might give up flying Stedger encouraged this unusual activity to save time and money. To save bussing passengers from the alternate airport back to Rockland. You can almost feel the frustration and anger that the chief pilot was experiencing... haven't we all said this at one time or another.. again more frustration, anger, fatigue, stress. Jim and his wife had recently divorced and he could only be with his son on weekends. Lately there were new restrictions imposed on his cherished weekend visits. Jim usually drove the fifty-four miles back and forth to Brunswick every night no matter how late. The familiar surroundings were his roots. But recently Jim had begun coming home late and on that particular morning of May 30th., he had been out past midnight the night before. Liveware : Separation and divorce is second in rank only to the to death of a spouse in causes of life event stressors. Coupled with his visitation restrictions, we have a wounded pilot here. Loss of self-esteem in a marriage break-up is another stress factor. Some individuals mistakenly try and recapture self-esteem in every other bed in town and to Jim's acquaintances it seemed he was constantly generating coupled relationships and the joke was he was coming to work every morning from different directions . T he noisy right engine was a source of concern to all the pilots. The chief mechanic had begged Stengar to send him and his men to Pratt & Whitney turbine engine maintenance school when they bought the Otter... ...Stengar refused.. Hardware: In this situation we have a faulty and noisy right engine. These were turbine engines. The mechanic at Down East was an excellent mechanic on piston engines but was not experienced in the turbine aircraft and they continually had problems with them. The damn right engine was noisy and had started vibrating again. Communication between pilots and co-pilots was by means of yelling and sign language, it was difficult. Stengar had refused to consider buying an intercom system for the pilots in the Otter. Cockpit Environment .. it's what the pilots had to deal with. Noise will cause stress, loud ambient noise will almost certainly fatigue you quickly. Prolonged exposure to vibration has a similar effect. It induces fatigue, stress, headaches, muscular discomfort, all of which will will detract from your duties. We can see in his statement, trying to yell or use sign language when the hands are supposed to be on the controls, is a very difficult and stressful way of communicating. The engine and prop. controls were on the ceiling. The flap handle didn t have any notches for various setting like 10, 20, 30 degrees. You could only tell your flap setting by a small gauge above the instrument panel. By day you had to cup your hand around it to read and by night you had to use a flash light to read it. The co-pilots altimeter needle was sticky - jumping several hundred feet at a time, one second it would read 1000 ft. and the next second 800 feet. Hardware - Liveware : Although the De Havilland Otter is a reliable aircraft, serious Human Factor engineering were deficient in this design. The cockpit design layout had not been designed with a pilots human frailties or limitations in mind. There should have been tactile feedback from the flap setting handle. - A series of notches or clicks to feedback information automatically to the pilot. The airspeed and landing techniques for landing with 20 degrees flap are considerable different from those required to land with 10 degrees flap. The 20 degree flaps setting will cause you to drop faster. The sticky or intermittent altimeter would be a major source of concern and stress in any flight environment and more so in the fog bound landscape of New England on a night Instrument Approach. The instrument panel was a challenge to see at night or in bad weather. Some of the instruments lights were Red and some were White. The white lights destroyed the pilots night vision, but if it were turned down the instruments illuminated by the red light could hardly be seen.,. In addition to being down right dangerous, the poor instrument lighting was another stressor contributing to the chronic fatigue of the pilots. but Stengar would not provide the funds to standardize the instrument lighting. Co-pilot Hines Had just started at Downeast Airlines three months previously. He was an exceptionally weak pilot especially in the Otter which he had only 46 hours. A captain had had to seize the controls from Hines on one occasions during an approach because he was all over the sky and chasing the needles. Liveware - Liveware In the cockpit environment you've going to be in somebody's space for hours. It isn't like the bridge of a ship where you can go to the other side. You're strapped in beside him, you're looking at him, you're invading each others space so there is a necessity to get along, or to understand these dynamics at least. Hines got behind the aircraft on instrument approaches and had a bad habit of touching things , operating flaps and controls without telling the other pilots, he did not understand how to operate in a two-man crew environment. Jim Merryman knew none of this, the other captains failed to mention this to him. Nobody had told the chief pilot that the co-pilot was having these difficulties with the aircraft. Crew Resource Management, or Bridge Resource Management, wasn't a training requirement in 1979. Obviously, the crew communication on this deck was dysfunctional to say the least. Boston 7.00 p.m. Co-pilot Hines phoned Rockland at 7.00 p.m. to check the weather and was told by Rocky that it was down to 700 ft. with visibility 3/4 Miles. Hines voiced his concern about aircraft performance and the fog, but was told by Rocky to bring the aircraft back. If they had a missed approach they could go to Augusta, their alternative. Liveware - Liveware : Rocky the owner's son was acting as the weather observer and all round agent and was saying "bring that plane back, or else dad will be mad"... Remember the minimums as I mentioned were 440 feet at Rockland, so legally they can get in under these conditions. Hines knew that Merryman would have him fly the return leg and he didn t feel comfortable. Hines wanted out of this flight. Merryman insisted and explained to Hines that he would put on extra fuel and divert to Augusta without hesitation. Hines flew the Otter as pilot-in-command and Merryman handled the radio work. Rockland weather: 300 ft. overcast, 3/4 mile visibility. Augusta weather: 1200 feet overcast, 10 mile visibility. Jim was weary and the noise and vibrations were endless and he knew he would have to watch Hines carefully on the approach, although without an intercom it was difficult to function as a crew. Maybe he had a premonition and was nervous about the weather or flying the Otter with the Captain who was also chief pilot, nervous about the engine....nervous about everything. A hell of a way for a pilot to start the return trip to Riceland with 16 souls onboard. They did radio Bangor, Maine, and got the Rockland weather report, it was now down to 300 feet...below minimums... They shouldn't have even attempted the approach at this point. Rockland weather: 300 ft. overcast, 3/4 mile visibility. Augusta weather: 1200 feet overcast, 10 mile visibility. Jim clicked the microphone 5 times rapidly to remotely turn on the runway lights at Rockland but they could not see the airport environment in the fog. Hines began the descent for the approach from 7000 ft. to 3000 ft., he retarded the power and moved the flaps mistakenly to the 20 degree position instead of the 10 degree position . Jim looked at the flap indicator but couldn t make it out on the first glance. Tired, Jim expected to read 10 degrees. Unseen in the ill-lighted cockpit, the flap needle indicator was at 20 degrees. You can turn on airport lighting in remote locations just by clicking your transmit button five times rapidly and the lights come on for 15 minutes and you can repeat this procedure, but they weren't going to see the runway lights anyway as it was completely socked in. Remember the flaps were at 20 degrees and they didn't realize it they were descending faster then they knew. The chain of small errors was complete the fix was in. At at this point in time they had two minutes to live. At approx. 20:50 hr. The Twin Otter was now 2 miles from the end of the runway at an airspeed of 110 M.P.H. Neither pilot realized that the aircraft was descending faster than usual for a normal approach. They were now below 500 feet in fog...... Seconds later . the aircraft pounded into the forest - 350 feet from the shoreline of a place ironically named Otter Point. Now let's put it all together. Anyone of those faults were not critical by themselves, but somehow they all lined up that day and away they went. Liveware : the chief pilot, was suffering from chronic fatigue and stress both in his personal life and his working environment. Liveware - Liveware : We have this tight coupled complex system on an instrument approach and the two most important components of the system are malfunctioning. One component, the co-pilot is incompetent, and the other component is suffering chronic fatigue and cannot act as a reliable component or backup to the system Liveware-Environment : The bad weather environment (fog), adding fatigue and stress....- a noisy environment contributing to fatigue and stress and possible error inducing mis-communications...-a company environment that encourages risk taking, if the blame can be put on the dead pilot why not promote risk taking for profit. As an added note, Downeast had a previous accident on 19 Aug. 1971 in which three people died and 5 others seriously injured for life. The accident was no exception to the investigators. They determined that a perfectly good aircraft with operating engines and adequate fuel had been flown into a hill (in a foggy approach) by a pilot who screwed up it was pilot error . No one looked deeper in 1971. Pilot error, case closed. Two other incidents occurred in 1976 and 1977, both non injuries. The aircraft in the 1977 incident clipped the trees on its low approach in fog. Now remember the Minimum s for Rockland airport is 440 ft. Trees don't grow that high in Maine. And finally we have the Regulatory Environment that is essentially at that time ineffective in preventing the illegal activities of Downeast airlines. In fact at that time, the FAA had just started to document a problem almost as serious as aircrew fatigue. ... -Inspector Fatigue-, inspector burnout, disillusionment, disgust. Retirements were rising in direct proportion to the pressures that deregulation was placing on the inspectors shoulders, -yet manpower was being reduced at the same time. . So we have all the environment systems dysfunctional. Software : Training was minimal or non-existent and SOP s (standards operating procedures) were illegal Hardware: We've already gone through that one. We've got the faulty engines, non standard and non consistent cockpit lighting of instruments, faulty flap handle design, faulty flap position indicator, non existent cockpit intercom, vibration from right engine, noisy working environment, unusual cockpit control layout. A lot of things to deal with in those two minutes in which you have to perform at 100%. Every landing the pilot makes is different and every one is essentially his first or his last. In this particular accident there were too many issues stacked up against the pilot to deal with the most critical portion of flight, an instrument landing at night in fog. Why did it take so long to associate human performance with accidents? There were many reasons why. one being that it was not polite to recognize the existence of crew performance problems in light of the elevated public relations image of a Captain. Captains of Ship s and Aircraft did not have such ordinary human behaviour deficiencies. That's why they are Captains, they had The Right Stuff. Even the Captains believed it. this has turned out to be The Wrong Stuff. Before I conclude I would like to refer to the overall Human Factor issues in the Marine world, and I quote There is probably no enterprise that could profit more from human factor considerations than the merchant shipping industry. The accident figures are incredible: on average, about 370 merchant vessels are lost at sea each year - one a day! Regulations concerning staffing, qualifications (other than officers), training, crew communication, and operations are almost non-existent. At a joint safety meeting between aviation and marine experts in London in 1970, the two domains seemed a century apart, and those from the marine world readily admitted it (Royal Aeronautical Society, 1990) Robert Helmreich, Barbara Kanki & Earl Wiener s book CRM , 1993 Why do these two domains seem a century apart? The answer partly lies in the fact that the air transport system was regulated from the beginning by each nation because the first planes flew primarily within the nation. E.g. Postal Air service, Government survey services. Pilots and owners grew up with this regulatory system and made it work. It was comparatively easy then to extend the practice to international contacts. The Marine world has not had that experience. Nations have little experience with national regulatory systems in the marine world; most have few ports, and these are visited by foreigners as well as nationals. National regulations were minor and slow to come. International regulations are even less significant. The potential for CRM and other human factors areas such as our topic today Fatigue to contribute to the safety in the maritime industry is great, but whether it will ever be realized is difficult to say. There is a humongous inertia to overcome. The Nautical Institute noted that despite the efforts of this Organization, there has been little sign of world -wide improvement to regulate safety , it summarized another study this way,- as the Rochdale report pointed out A Ship beneficially owned in one Country, directly owned by a company resident in another Country, registered under a flag of a third Country, managed by a company in a forth Country, but on long term charter to interest in a fifth Country an even sub-chartered to interest in another Country. This complexity reflects the efforts of owners and shippers to avoid the efforts of Countries to impose safety constraints. The economics of this system conspire to induce error. Who is responsible? It s a tough call! There are other reasons why the two domains are far apart: -politicians travel on Airlines, - they don t travel on freighters, -easily identifiable victims and perpetrators in aircraft accidents- VS.- Marine victims who are sometimes unidentifiable and /or are low status (foreign crew) ..-the aviation world has strong unions: the pilots , mechanics, cabin Crew.- VS - poorly organized or unorganized seamen., -victims of air disaster are first party victims whereas Marine disaster such as pollution and toxic spills produce third party victims who are anonymously random. -federal presence and international controls promoting aviation safety VS International marine associations concerned with safety are advisory in nature, not pro-active. -a confidential voluntary aviation incident reporting system implemented VS Traditions of the Sea promotes risk acceptance, -elasticity of demand in the airlines system allows passengers to change to varies air carriers or planes for safety reasons, The marine World faces other major issues in it s operating system, -Captains can be on duty for forty -eight continuous hours, -Mates on a 14 hour days in coastal waters is not uncommon, - Crew communication problems, - native languages are not shared by officers and crew, -Ships sail with faulty equipment, -Captains are fined for missed schedules regardless of weather, -Crews rotate every voyage in many cases, resulting in little incentive to maintain equipment or learn how to use it. Now these are very serious issues but let reflect, it s not that long ago that aviation was a little messed up too. -50% of allied aircrew lost during W.W.II were lost in training accidents. -Germany lost 25% of it total aircraft production in the last year of the war in ferrying accidents. -31 of the first 40 pilots were killed trying to meet the imposed schedules of the US Air Mail Service designed by people who didn't fly. . (I think I d rather be fined for being late) It s not that long ago that the aviation world started to take human performance seriously. And this is a very significant point , it was championed by individuals rather than management. Individuals that took a leadership role upon themselves to promote the importance of human factor performance. Individuals like Dr. Edwards, Earl Wiener NASA/AMES, Prof. Charles Perrow, Al Dielh NTSB, Frank Hawkins KLM, Moray Hill TSB, Justice Moshansky, Robert Helmreich U of Tex., John Lauber FAA, and the list goes on. All these fellows stuck their necks out and made it work. In the early 80 s Airline management didn t want this stuff. Some saw it as meddling, training with clinical psychology, others feared that the Captain s authority would be eroded by this kind of Dale Carnegie charm school approach to developing interpersonal skills. Human factors performance education was welcomed almost unanimously by the pilot community the system operators and grew by the synergy it created. Leadership by individuals, not management was responsible for bringing human factors into the forefront as a safety inducing factor. The Marine world doesn t have to go through that process of re-inventing the wheel, the path has been cleared, the examples of Human Factor training and Knowledge and its effects on positive safety is well documented.. As the old saying goes, if you think safety training is expensive, try having an accident and I conclude and it might sound brazen but I want to make the point ...in light of the human factor research, documentation, and resources now available, there should be no excuse for anyone of us in this room to be sitting in a board of inquiry at the pointed end of the stick or for any one of us to ever have to defend ourselves in a civil suite because one of our employees slammed into a tree after falling asleep at the wheel, on his way home after 13 days of 12 hour shifts because we didn t have a replacement for him. Human Factors is a way of life 24 hours a day. Thank You References: Blind Trust, John Nance; Normal Accidents, Charles Perrow; Human Factors In Flight, Frank H. Hawkins Cockpit Resource Management, Robert Helmreich, Barbara Kanki & Earl Wiener; Justice Moshansky, Dryden Commission bw_feb99.htm NEW BOATING SAFETY REGULATIONS - EXPECTED TO SAVE LIVES - FEB 99 TORONTO - David Anderson, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, has unveiledchanges to the regulatory framework governing recreational boating safetyin Canada. The changes are designed to reduce the annual level of boatingfatalities and accidents in Canada from their current levels of 200 and6,000 respectively. "These are not 'made-in-Ottawa' solutions," said Minister Anderson.Describing the extensive consultations that gave rise to the regulations,Minister Anderson stated, "They result from an extensive process of dialoguewith Canadians who share an interest in making our waters safer. Theseindividuals are the real architects of these common-sense and balancedmeasures." The new measures were presented to some 60 boating association representativesfrom across Canada at the Toronto International Boat Show. Highlights ofthe changes include the introduction of- minimum age limits for operating power boats above 10 horsepower andpersonal water craft; mandatory operator competency requirements, to be phased-in over 10 years, for all operators of powered boats used for recreational purposes ; and new minimum safety equipment and operation standards affecting allboats. "Right now in Canada, anyone of any age can operate any boat of anysize without any formal training or experience. In fact, two-thirds ofthose operating powered boats in Canada lack any formal training in boatingsafety or operation," noted Minister Anderson. "With more and more boaterstaking to the water-ways in new, and increasingly powerful vessels, thestatus quo is clearly a recipe for disaster," he concluded. Age & Horsepower Restrictions Effective April 1, 1999, children under the age of 12 will no longerbe permitted to operate boats above 10 horsepower for recreational purposesunless accompanied by a person 16 years of age or older. On the same date,youth at least 12 years of age, but under 16 years of age, will no longerbe permitted to operate boats above 40 horsepower unless accompanied byan individual 16 years of age or older. Finally, as of April 1, 1999, thenew minimum age for operating Personal Water Craft (PWC) will be 16 yearsof age. Operator Competency Beginning on September 15, 1999 youth under 16 years of age (as of April1, 1999) operating powered craft used for recreational purposes will berequired to have proof of operator competency. This requirement will beextended to all operators of power boats less than 4 metres in length,as well as all PWCs, by September 15, 2002. By September 15, 2009, proofof operator competency will be required for all power boat operators. Proof of operator competency can be obtained in one of three ways. Thefirst is by successfully completing a written test administered by an accreditedcourse provider. (Experienced boaters are unlikely to require formal trainingbeforehand to complete the test). This one-time only requirement is goodfor life. The second is by providing proof of having successfully completeda boating safety course prior to April 1, 1999. The third, for those whodo not have an operator's card but wish to rent a boat, involves completionof a dockside boating safety checklist with the rental agent. Visitors to Canada utilizing their own boats- typically from the UnitedStates- will only be obliged to meet the operator competency requirementafter 45 consecutive days. As all 16 states that border Canada, or canbe accessed via Canadian waters, have in place or are implementing mandatoryboater education or operator licensing programs, these measures are unlikelyto impact on tourism. CCG is working with its American counterparts ona variety of joint initiatives to improve boating safety. Small Vessel Regulations (Minimum Safety Equipment/Safety Precautions) The final area of regulation involves bringing the 20 year-old SmallVessel Regulations into line with today's boating environment. New operatingstandards and minimum safety equipment requirements are being introducedthat will provide flexibility for boaters to take into account the typeof equipment required for their boat and boating activity. The regulationsalso define a new "careless operation" offence that will allow enforcementagencies to issue tickets to reckless boaters who put themselves and othersat risk. The foregoing is taken from a Fisheries and Oceans news release dated18th January, 1999. It Makes you Wonder. While I am in full agreement with the measures outlined in the newsrelease above, several questions come to mind. Transport Canada, Marine Safety Branch, is normally responsible forsetting training standards and certification requirements for vessel operators.Did Transport Canada want to distance itself from this issue? Fishing vessels under 60 gross tons do not require a certificated operator.If the vessel is being used for recreational fishing, will the operatorrequire the proof of competency described in the news release? Vessels of less than 5 gross tons carrying 12 or less passengers donot require a certificated operator. Many of these vessels are RHIB's with200+ horse power in the whale watching business. If the same vessel isbeing used for recreational purposes, the operator will have to have proofof competency. It makes me wonder. National CMAC Spring 1999 Canadian Marine Advisory Council (CMAC) A National meeting of the Canadian Marine Advisory Councilwas held May 4 - 6, 1999 at the Government Conference Centre,Ottawa. Following the opening plenary session a number of WorkingGroups held meetings over the next two days. These Working Groupsand the subject of their discussion are listed below. GMDSS Working Group - reviewing draft radio regulationsto give effect to the GMDSS. Marine Occupational Safety and Health Regulations (MOSH)Working Group - conductinga comprehensive review of the MOSH and achieve consensus for changethrough labour & management bipartite consultation facilitatedjointly by Transport Canada, Marine Safety and Human ResourcesDevelopment Canada, Labour Programs (HRDC Labour). Ballast Water Working Group - a consultative body representativeof parties that have recognized interest in the subject of ballastwater control and inspection for the purpose of reducing the riskof introductions of harmful aquatic organisms and pathogens. ThisWG will make recommendations to the Standing Committee on theEnvironment (SCE) on policy, regulations, operations and othermatters as appropriate, as directed by the SCE. Small Passenger Vessel Working Group - the objectiveof the WG is to identify the needs, interests and process forreviewing and amending the TP11717, as recommended by the StandingCommittee on Small Commercial Vessels in November '98 CMAC. Transportation of Dangerous Goods Working Group - to provide input on final documentsof Part XI of the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations,and to review and revise the Dangerous Goods Shipping Regulationsin line with the new multi-modal Transportation of Dangerous Goodsincluding related issues. The Sub-Committee on Training and Certification meton 3rd. May, prior to the start of the main CMAC meetings. Theagenda items included: STCW and the Canadian Marine Industry. New certificate structure Regulatory changes required to comply with STCW STCW submission to IMO under Regulation I/7 of the STCW 95 Future acceptance of foreign certificates Proposed changes to Medical Care requirements Hours of rest Issue of Continued Proficiency Certificates Definition of Near Coastal voyages Proposed two tier examination structure. Medical Requirements Designated Physicians Use of Hearing Aids Lantern test developments Crewing and Marine Certification Regulations Section 4 Marine Certification Regulations and proposed amendment Section 21 Crewing Regulations, changes to assist the fishing industry Bridge Watchman Certificate Command Endorsement Proficiency in Survival Craft renewals Direct Entry requirements for foreign certificate holders Renewal of SIM examination ROC/GOC requirements Sea service requirements for WKM (R) and WKM (S) Space does not allow for a detailed report on all of theseitems. Several recommendations were made and accepted which willimpact on the certification and training of ship's personnel.Changes to regulations will be promulgated in the usual mannerby Transport Canada, Marine Safety. Both Transport Canada andCanadian Coast Guard maintain web pages devoted to CMAC. Theycan be accessed by Transport Canada http://www.tc.gc.ca/cmac/cmac.htm Canadian Coast Guard http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/cmac-ccmc/main.htm Report of the Working Group on Log Tow Lights Report of the Working Group on Log Tow Lights September 16, 2002 Vancouver Background The issue concerning the acceptability of current log tow lighting arrangements was initiated by a request from the Council of Marine Carriers (CMC). In a letter dated July 6, 2001 to the Director General TCMS, CMC requested that the navigation light arrangement currently used on log tows be specifically recognized in the Collision Regulations. After this request was made, a meeting was held between TCMS, CMC and towing representatives in Vancouver in September 2001 for a preliminary review. Following this, a presentation was made at the Pacific CMAC in October 2001 and at the national CMAC in November 2001 and no initial concerns on current practices were expressed. The Working Group The reason for the present working group was to provide TCMS with information, feedback, and expertise on the adequacy of log tow lighting practices. The working group gave consideration to current practices, possible alternatives and whether current practices can or should be improved. Although a number of different sectors of the marine industry were invited to participate, the working group consisted of 4 representatives from the towing industry, two masters from BC Ferries and 3 marine inspectors from TCMC. The participants were: Robert Turner TCMS HQ Peter Woodward Council Marine Carriers Harold Stokke Sr. Master BCFC Colin Eckford Washington Marine Group George Karras TCMS Pacific Mitch Hughes Rivtow Marine (SMIT) John Houde TCMC Pacific Heiko Hansen BCFC Bob Hodder Hodder Tugboat C. Ltd. Current Practice Current practice is to have a kerosene/oil lamp on each corner of the log boom. Such lights exhibit a white all round light with a visibility range of up to about 2 miles under ideal conditions. Log tows typically measure about 50m in breadth and 300-400m in length. Towlines are also several hundred metres in length . Log tows operate at a speed of 1 to 2 knots. Lights are frequently lost during a trip. Collision Regulations The Collision Regulations require inconspicuous, partly submerged towed objects/vessels to exhibit a 3-mile all round light every 100m along each side (Rule 24 (g)). A typical log boom would therefore require 10 lights. However, the Collision Regulations allow that where Rule 24(g) is impractical, all possible measures should be taken to light the tow to indicate its presence (Rule 24(h)). To fit 10 lights to each log tow in compliance with Rule 24(g) is considered by tow operators to be impractical, costly and unnecessary from a safety perspective. Rule 24 (h) puts the onus on the tow operator to determine what measures are possible. For the tow operator, a regulatory amendment would give formal recognition to current practices. Having a specific regulatory requirement for log tow lighting is deemed particularly important to tow operators in view of recent TSB concerns about lights being used in various towing operations, including log towing, that do not meet the required range of visibility. Comply with Rule 24 (g)? The first question asked of the working group was whether it is in fact impractical for the log tows to comply with Rule 24(g). The group considered the challenges to lighting log tows for example: lights need to be portable, lack of acceptable existing portable navigation light products at a reasonable cost, frequent loss of lights during voyages, mounting platform is unstable, time and effort to attach numerous lights and cost of using other types of lights. The group agreed that full compliance with Rule 24(g) is impractical. Safety The group was made aware of TSB concerns as a result of its investigation into the Sunboy/Narvaez collision. Although the incident did not directly involve log tows, TSB s investigation into towing practices resulted in a general concern about the use of lights that may not have adequate visibility ranges to minimize risk of collision (Marine Safety Advisory 04/00 and TSB Recommendation M01-04). There has been only one collision since 1977 involving a log tow where the log tow lights were specifically a factor. In a ten year period (1991-2000), there have been at least 4, and as many as 8 recorded collisions with log tows at night but not necessarily due to the log tow lights. From the 8 incidents, the consequences of the collisions range from 1 fatality, two with considerable damage to the colliding vessel, and several with minor damage. It was agreed that navigation lighting has limited effectiveness if vessel operators are unaware or unable to recognize the towing lights of the tug. New Light Product A prototype of a 3-mile LED portable all-round white navigation light was looked at. Testing results have recently been received and will be reviewed for eventual acceptance by TCMS. The light with solar switch is capable of operating on a single battery for 7 nights at 15 hours per night. The purchase cost is estimated to be around $120 US. In general, tow representatives saw the light as an acceptable alternative to the oil lights if accepted for use by TCMS. Alternatives Consideration was given to among other things; the status quo, different spacing between the white all-round lights along the length of the tow, a single additional light in the middle, adding a light in mid-length along each side and use of a searchlight. It was noted that the Collision Regulations allow alternative lighting for barges and in particular Rule 24 (m), which requires an all-round white light located at the middle point for tows over 100m. Conclusions Range of Visibility: A 3-mile light should be used once a portable 3-mile light has been accepted by TCMS and available on the market. Arrangement of Lights Although there were no specific concerns known about the current arrangement of a light on each corner, the group agreed that it would be prudent and reasonable to have an additional light in the middle of each side and, for log tows less than 25m in breadth, a single additional light at mid-length. Vessel Operator Awareness The group stressed the overall importance of small vessel operator familiarity with the Collision Regulations, and specifically with the tug and tow light provisions. Nautical Institute Nautical Institute British Columbia Branch Minutes of the Directors Meeting, Tuesday, 11 th May 2004 Present: Captain S.W. Bowles FNI Chairman Captain A.S. Patterson Treasurer Captain J. K. Steele Secretary Directors: Captain B. Silvester FNI Captain B. Johnston FNI Captain D. Smiley Captain R. Smith Captain C. Frappell Members: Captain D. Whittaker FNI Regrets received from: Captain Shard, Lt Cdr Stanford, Captains Snider, Farid, Drewery, Lewis, Clarkson, Avey, Lee, H. Silvester The Chairman called the meeting to order at 1703 hours and bade everyone welcome, thanking them all for attending. Item 1: Adoption of the Agenda Captain Johnston requested an item to be added under Any Other Business; Electronic Charts and Captain Smith requested that a link request be dealt with in the same manner. It was moved by Captain Silvester and seconded by Captain Smiley that the agenda as amended be adopted. Carried Item 2: Minutes of the last meeting It was moved by Captain Smiley and seconded by Captain Patterson that the Minutes of the last meeting be approved as published. Carried Item 3: Business arising from the last meeting In response to the Chairman s enquiry, Captain Smith reported no feedback via the website on the subject of Branch participation in the public discussions on the BC Oil and Gas Exploration Moratorium. Item 4: Seminar Debrief The was a general discussion about the recent seminar and it appears that at least half of those attending were not NI members thus ensuring that the Branch enhanced its visibility in the marine community more than has been the case in the past. An informal poll at the door provided the following interesting statistics with respect to the power of the advertising purchased by the Branch. Some 47 of those attending heard of the seminar via the following methods: Word of mouth-16 Email-9 Branch website- 6 Harbour and Shipping advertisement- 0 Seaways insert -4 Chamber of Shipping -0 Flyer produced by Communications Director 6 Bow Wave 1 From a guest speaker 5 While it was agreed that the venue was most suitable, and filling the room to capacity helped foster the impression of considerable interest in the subject, it was noted that the value for money in terms of the catering was not as should have been. While it was accepted that the costs of catering at a hotel such as the Ocean Pointe Resort will inevitably be higher than some venues used in the past, the quality of the food etc should be commensurably higher. This lead to considerable discussion. In summing up, the Chairman made it clear that in his opinion it was a very good seminar indeed and there were lessons learned as follows: Food: we must ensure value for money Venue: there is considerable benefit in using a high-visibility venue as it is undoubtedly a drawing card. Advertising : we did not get value for money this time and we need to go back to the drawing board Audio/Visual: we could have benefited from a microphone for the speaker Photographs: we need to follow up and make sure good ones are on file and used with articles for the trade papers and house journals. The Chairman requested Captain Smiley to draft letters for his signature, thanking the speakers. Action: Captain Smiley Item 5: Treasurer s Report The Treasurer tabled his monthly report showing that the Branch now has a total worth of $11,326.74. The recent seminar created a small gain of $42 with a paid attendance of 70. Catering charges of $38 per person were higher than usual and this matter was discussed under Item 4. Item 6: The Lashing Code This should more correctly be called the Code of Safe Practices for Cargo Stowage and Securing. Captain Johnston briefed the meeting in detail on his concerns with errors and weaknesses in the Code as presently published. He especially mentioned the lack of data for lashings beyond the 30 degree level which is needed by industry. He went on to circulate a draft letter to NIHQ with detailed, section by section, comments for review and onward transmission to the appropriate IMO committee. Before the Chairman signs the covering letter, he suggested that it would be most useful to have another member of the Branch who is well-versed in these matters review the proposal and verify his findings. The Chairman suggested that Captain Johnston contact Captain Fothergill who is well-known for his work on cargo stowage and ask for his opinion. Captain Johnston agreed to do this and report the results at the next meeting. Action: Captain Johnston Item 7: Combining Future AGMs with Seminars The Chairman introduced this item by making the observation that by a series of coincidences, the AGM this year and the Spring Seminar were held relatively close together in terms of dates. This has given rise to a considerable amount of effort by those organizing the events over a short period of time. He personally felt that the AGM is a business meeting to close one year and to plan the next. However, he noted that other organizations make a point of holding their AGM in conjunction with some other major event, often one lasting more than a day. Captain Silvester agreed that the BC Towboat Owners hold their AGM the evening before their seminar. He went on to say that it might well considerably reduce the business of the AGM if it were squeezed into the start of the day of a seminar, particularly since we tend to only start when those arriving by ferry can be there. He considered that an alternative might be to hold the AGM after a dinner at the conclusion of the seminar, as the business of the AGM should not have to be rushed through. A general discussion ensued with many points of view being expressed, both for and against a combined AGM and Seminar that would see the need for some attendees to stay overnight either in Vancouver or Victoria. In response to a concern expressed by the Treasurer that the AGM should be soon after the books are closed at the end of the fiscal year, the Chairman considered that if need be, the fiscal year could be altered and a budget for 15 months developed to account for the changeover. After hearing all the points of view, the Chairman decided that the matter would remain on the table for the next meeting at which time it might be possible to hear the opinions of Directors not present. To stimulate feedback, he will generate an email with some options to which replies will be invited from all concerned. Action: Chairman Item 8: Mr. Alexander Skingley MNI- Enquiry The Secretary asked that this item be deleted as he had received the advice he was seeking. Item 9: Naval Liaison Program- Report of Voyage with Captain Drouin. The Chairman expressed his considerable pleasure at receiving a copy of a report from LCDR Stefan King, Canadian Navy covering his voyage as the guest of Captain Michel Drouin aboard a merchant ship from Victoria to Vancouver. LCDR King is the Commanding Officer of HMCS BRANDON, one of the navy s Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels and the trip was part of a naval liaison program that commenced in 1994 in which naval officers accompany a pilot aboard a merchant ship in local waters, the better to understand civilian marine operations and the challenges of handling very large vessels. The Chairman spoke for all present when he said that it was time that Captain Drouin s dedication and commitment to this important program was recognized for its considerable worth and requested the Secretary to draft for his signature a suitable letter to Captain Drouin. Action: Secretary Item 10: Letters of welcome to new members: The Secretary, barely containing his excitement, reported that London has now instituted a system of updating Branch Secretaries on a quarterly basis as to the official list of Branch members, together with those who have just joined, or just left. As the production of an accurate list of Branch members has been a somewhat elusive goal the Secretary has been pursuing for some time with limited success, he informed the meeting that he looked forward to conducting a careful comparison between his records and those of NIHQ. He promised that when this has been done, he will let the Webmaster know so that the list on the website can be brought up to date. He will also let the Directors know the total number of members in the BC Branch as soon as possible, as requested. On the same subject, the Secretary pointed out that this is now perhaps the time to initiate a letter of welcome to new members as their names and addresses are passed to us from London. To date, contact with new members has been sporadic at best and some may well have wondered about their welcome when they received no communication from anyone, once they paid their dues. He suggested that as part of his duties that he develop a standard letter of welcome for the Chairman s signature that would describe how the Branch functions, contact persons, and an open invitation to attend our monthly Board meetings. The Chairman welcomed this suggestion and asked that this be done as soon as possible. Action: Secretary Item 11: Any Other Business ECDIS Captain Johnston, as the Branch representative to PACMAR, circulated documents encouraging organizations to write to various governmental authorities concerning the award the Canadian Hydrographic Service of exclusive rights to electronic chart reproduction to NDI. As Captain Johnston pointed out, it seemed unfair to take what is public data and provide it exclusively to one company, thereby eliminating any chance of free market competition. The Chairman agreed that the Nautical Institute s voice should be heard on this and asked that the appropriate letters be sent to him for onward transmission. Action: Chairman Captain Johnston Web Link Request Captain Smith, as Webmaster, reported that he had a request for a link with the Titanic Nautical Resources Centre and asked for direction. After some discussion, it was agreed that the nature of the information provided by this organization was sufficiently broad as to be considered part of the nautical profession and the webmaster was given permission to agree to the request. Action: Captain Smith On the subject of the Branch website, the Chairman complimented Captain Smith on the new look of the site and recommended everyone make a point of viewing it. He suggested the perhaps some of the pictures taken by Mr. Eric Manchester at the seminar might be included on the site and asked that the Communications Director contact Mr. Manchester to see if that could be arranged. Action: Captain Snider Item 12: Next Meeting The next meeting will be Tuesday, 8 th June 2004 in the same location at 1700 hours. The ship being in her berth, it was moved by Captain Frappell that the meeting be adjourned. Carried Nautical Institute Nautical Institute British Columbia Branch Minutes of the Directors Meeting Monday, 14 th April 2003 aboard MV Spirit of Vancouver Island Present: Captain S. Bowles - Chairman Captain G Drewery - Vice Chairman (Mainland) Captain Z. Farid - Vice Chairman (Island) Captain J Steele - Secretary Directors: Captains Lewis, Johnston, Smiley, Smith, Avey, Lee Members: Captain D. Whitaker, Mr. D. Willows Regrets received from: Captains Patterson, Shard, B. Silvester, Clarkson, Marshall, Snider, Frappell, Ruether, Lt Cdr Stanford. Item 1: Chairman s Remarks Captain Bowles welcomed everyone to the first meeting of the 2003/04 Directors and noted the presence of Mr. Dave Willows AMNI who everyone had met at least once before at the AGM. Mr Willows had expressed an interest in helping the Branch and had kindly offered his services in any way that might be useful. The Chairman had therefore asked him to act as the Recording Secretary to free up the Hon. Sec. to participate in the discussions. He went on to say that it is his intention to set the Branch on a path to new goals and horizons and that his recent discussions with both the President and the Secretary of the NI in London had proved very useful in that regard. Item 2: Adoption of the Agenda It was moved by Captain Lewis and seconded by Captain Drewery that the agenda be accepted as printed. Carried Item 3: Minutes of the last meeting The meeting reviewed the Minutes of the February Directors meeting and the action items contained therein. It was moved that the Minutes be approved by Captain Farid and seconded by Captain Lewis. Carried Item 4: Business Arising from the last meeting The Secretary reminded the meeting of the commitment to Captain Holder in early June. The ColReg amendment proposal re Log Tow Lights was raised at the Regional CMAC and the Branch received due credit for its support. This proposed amendment to the Canadian Modifications will now proceed to Ottawa. The ColReg amendment proposal re the use of Radiotelephones from Captain Johnston will also be going to Ottawa from Transport Canada Vancouver although it is not clear what consultative process will occur in Ottawa. Captain Farid will investigate informally during his CMAC visit. Action: Captain Farid. Item 5: Treasurer s Report In view of the absence of the Treasurer at sea, the Chairman summed up his report by saying that the bottom line showed a net worth of the Branch of just over $6,000 and that the AGM was subsidized by some $670 . The annual Subvention from NI HQ had been received. Item 6: Standing Arrangements for Monthly Meetings Some discussion on availability of each Director occurred and the Chairman directed that the matter be deferred in light of the possible changes to the modus operandi of the Branch and a date for the next meeting would be set at the end of this one. Item 7: Notification for Consideration and Development The Chairman spoke at length on the importance of communication that is rapid and responsive to the needs of the members if we are to strike out along new paths and generate increased activity in the Branch. While he acknowledged that the maintenance of a worthwhile website was time-consuming , the results are well worth the effort. Members must feel that it is their primary means of raising issues; either to inform others of new events and issues or, equally importantly, to raise concerns for discussion. The web site will also be our voice pipe to the members as we consider bigger issues raised by the Nautical Institute as part of its Strategic Issues initiative. A concomitant issue is the response members are entitled to expect from the Directors when they raise issues via the website. The Chairman made it very clear that there must be a response mechanism and a means of tracking issues that makes sure that the system not only works, but is seen to be working. He indicated that this is an ongoing matter and that it would re-surface later. Item 8: Topics for CMAC Captain Farid reported that he had now received the CMAC Agenda for the semi-annual meeting in Ottawa 5-8May 2003. Overall, he saw the meeting to contain no potentially contentious issues, but rather a series of briefings by Transport Canada on the various ongoing projects. As an example he quoted the revisions to the Canada Shipping Act and Regulations, specifically the amalgamation of the Crewing and the Certification Regulations. He drew the members attention to the CMAC web site and invited any comments or concerns that he should take to Ottawa. Unless otherwise directed, he will keep his usual attentive watch on what is going on in as many committees as he can attend and will speak up on behalf of the NI when circumstances so dictate. Following on from the earlier discussion of the Collision Regulations amendments, he pointed out that nowhere in the CMAC agenda does the matter appear and that he would be approaching Transport Canada with an enquiry as to exactly how the process works, observing that the raison d etre of CMAC was to ensure full consultation with the marine industry. The Directors expressed their support for his approach and looked forward to his post meeting report with anticipation. Item 9: Proposed Anchoring Fees The issue of a proposal by the Provincial Government to charge a fee for anchoring in certain marine parks was